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ULLMAN v. UNITED SPATES
to the "up hill and down dale winding country roads of
Garrett County or Carroll County"" appear to be a matter
more for Legislative attention than judicial. One must not
lose sight of the fact that a court in construing a legislative
enactment must determine legislative intent and not the
relative merits of one or more legislative policies.
STANLEY L. SELIGMAN
The Spirit Of The Fifth Amendment Privilege
A- Study In Judicial Method
Ullmann v. United States'
William Ludwig Ullmann, ex-Treasury Department
official, at the command of a subpoena appeared before a
duly consituted Southern District of New York grand jury
that was investigating membership and activities of the
Communist Party. Ullmann refused to answer pertinent
questions, asserting instead, his privilege against self-in-
crimination. The United States Attorney, deeming Ull-
mann's testimony vital to the public need, countered with
a new Congress-bestowed weapon, sub-section (c) of the
Immunity Act of 1954.2 With the approval of the Attorney
General of the United States application was made to the
Federal District Court for an order to compel Ullmann to
answer. By the terms of the new Act,' immunity from
"Ibid, dis. op. 120. His argument in ithis instance would seem to be its
own refutation. From a practical standpoint, is it not essential that a
driver on one of these "washboard" roads, or on a hilly and winding road
be able to focus his attention on the road itself, and not have to worry
about others "popping out" from dirt roads or private driveways?
1 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
SPub. Law 600, 83rd Cong., 68 Stat. 745, 18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 3486 (1956).
For an informative discussion of the climate of opinion prior to the passage
of the Act see Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Georgetown L. J. 497 (1954).
It is apparent that popular clamor, spurred by such shibboleths as "Fifth
Amendment Communist", had engendered suggestions that the privilege be
modified, restricted or even abrogated to aid in the investigation of sub-
versive activity. The Congressional response was the Immunity Act of 1954.
Congress is not inexperienced in drafting immunity statutes, More than
twenty such statutes have been passed as adjuncts to Federal economic
regulations to assist in obtaining information helpful in operating the
agencies created by such regulations. For a tabulation of some of these
statutes see Shapiro v.'United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6 (1948).8 Ibid:
"(c) Whenever in the Judgment of a United States attorney the
testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other
evidence by any witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand
Jury or court of the United States involving any interference with or
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prosecution concerning any transaction, matter or thing
relating to the compelled testimony and from use of the
testimony itself as evidence in a criminal proceeding in any
court become consideration for the forfeiture of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.4 Ullmann vehemently contested the
application; in so doing he attacked the constitutionality
of the Immunity statute and further urged that if the
statute should be held good, the district court should exer-
cise discretion and deny the application.
The court ordered Ullmann to answer the grand jury's
questions; in the same breath they upheld the Immunity
Act. After an abortive appeal from the court order, Ull-
mann once again refused to testify. He was convicted of
contempt and his conviction was affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari;5 and, after due reflection upon
sub-section (c), reaffirmed with a new wrinkle the doc-
endangering of, or any plans or attempts to Interfere with or endanger,
the national security or defense of the United States by treason,
sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, violations of chapter
115 of title 18 of the United States Code, violations of the Internal
Security Act of 1950 (64 stat. 987), violations of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 755), as amended, violations of sections
212(a) (27), (28), (29) or 241(a) (6), (7) or 313(a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 182-186; 204-206; 240-241), and con-
spiracies involving any of the foregoing, Is necessary to the public
interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General shall make
application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify
or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this section, and upon
order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying or
from producting books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that
the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he Is compelled,
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evi-
dence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecution described in sub-
section (d) hereof) against him in any court.
"(d) No witness shall be exempt under the provision of this section
from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testi-
mony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this
section."
'Compare Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 141-142 (1913). In this
case there is an interesting interplay between the so-called "exchange" and
"pardon" theories of immunity statutes. A distinction is made between
amnesty, or group immunity, and the Fifth Amendment privilege. Congress
may grant a "pardon" equivalent to a general amnesty, Brown v. Walker,
161 U. S. 591 (1896). But this "exchange" of amnesty is coterminous with
the privilege. For an able comment on the legal principles involved see
Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 447 and 554 (1954). For a discussion of the "immunity bath"
problem and Congressional intent regarding the scope and purpose of the
new Act see Note, Immunity For Witnesses Before Congressional Com-
mittees; The Scope of Section 3486, 29 St. Johns L. Rev. 153, 155 (1954).
5349 U. S. 951 (1955).
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trine of the sixty year old 5-4 decision of Brown v. Walker.6
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held, that sub-
section (c) of the Immunity Act of 1954, relating to com-
pulsory immunity before a grand jury, was sufficient in
scope to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination
and, furthermore, not absolutely forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment.7 Using the broad sword of judicial power to
accept Congressional determination of the need for string-
ent methods to protect the nation, the court severed the
contemporary Gordian knot of sedition and the Fifth
Amendment privilege, but not without vigorous protes-
tations from their own ranks. The sharply contrasting
opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Douglas revisit a
galaxy of history to support divergent views of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. In a sense there pervades
in these opinions a tremor of a conflict of a far wider and
deeper kind, a conflict between two colossi of American
jurisprudence, judicial relativism' and judicial absolutism.9
The clash becomes manifest in the application of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's balancing-the-interests technique ° (in relat-
ing forfeiture of the privilege to the Immunity Act) versus
the shield of absolute silence approach" to the same prob-
lem so resourcefully adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas.
Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 1. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the Court,
in which 5 Justices concurred. Mr. Justice Reed concurred separately (cone.
op. 439), excepting to the statement that no constitutional guarantee enjoys
preference. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred,
dissented (dis. op. 440).
"Mr. Justice Holmes is the fountainhead of this approach to interpreting
the Constitution. Compare his intellectual diamonds:
"All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical ex-
treme. Yet all In fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy which are other than those on which the particular right is
founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a
certain point is reached."
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908).
"Many laws which would be vain to ask the court to overthrow could
be shown, easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one
or another of the great guarantees in the Bill of Rights. They more or
less limit the liberty of the individual, or they diminish property to a
certain extent."
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110 (1911).
This philosophy is an offshoot of natural law, which presupposes a body
of higher laws, basic and unchangeable. Compare the Ciceronlan approach
"that the true law was universal and unalterable and could not be abolished
by any legislation; it was valid for all nations and for all times." See
MutLLiE, THE USES OF THE PAST (Mentor ed., 1954) 201-202.
10 Of. his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494,
517 (1951).
1Cf. Mr. Justice Field, dissenting in Brown v. Walker, supra, n. 4, di8.
op. 628.
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Justice Frankfurter approached the controversial clause
of the Fifth Amendment with zealous regard for its history 2
and due reverence for its place in the development of our
liberty - "'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle
to make himself civilized'."'18 The Justice, mindful that the
soil in which the Bill of Rights grew was not a soil of arid
pedantry, 4 observed:
"As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference,
so none should suffer subordination or deletion 15 . . .
To view a particular provision of the Bill of Rights
with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted appli-
cation of it. This is to disrespect the Constitution.'
16
But to immunize witnesses is not to disrespect their privi-
lege. Long ago, in Brown v. Walker,17 a representative of
"That historically, the Fifth Amendment is to be liberally construed
and not to be dwindled into atrophy, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.
547 (1892) and Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951). In the
sixteenth century, the privilege was little more than an idea coined in the
Latin maxim, nemo tenetur se ipsum accu8are. See Griswold, The Fifth
Amendment; An Old and Good Friend, 40 A. B. A. J. 502 (1954). However
as early as 1650, it had become firmly embedded in the common law of
England. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161 (1955). In Eng-
land, the privilege remained a mere rule of evidence; in America it was
elevated to the dignity of a Constitutional right. Glickstein v. United States,
222 U. S. 139, 141 (1911). That historically the Fifth Amendment privilege
was designed to prevent attempts by the state to promote orthodoxy in faith
and politics by using the power of the criminal code, see Dixon, 8upra, n. 4,
447. Of. also Boudin, supra, n. 2, 502. A recent and extra-ordinary cam-
paign by both government and press has created the false impression, even
among many who should be better informed, that assertion of this par-
ticular constitutional right is an admission of guilt. For a cogent refutation
of this argument see Griswold, ibid. That fear of waiving the privilege is
a real one, of. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951) "[Wlhere
criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be
invoked to avoid disclosure of the details."
IGRIsWOLD, THE FiFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955) 7, quoted in Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956).
" Supra, n. 10, 521.
"Supra, n. 13, 428. Justice Reed took issue with this clause (cono. op.
439). Query, does this choice bit of dictum toll the death knell of the
"preferred freedoms" approach? For an insight into the "preferred free-
doms" philosophy see Mr. Justice Stone in U. S. v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U. S. 105, 115 (1943), Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945), and
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88 (1949), noted 10 Md. L. Rev. 355 (1949).
Ibid.
17161 U. S. 591 (1896). In this case Brown, an auditor for a railroad com-
pany, was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury investigating violations
of the Interstate Commerce Act. He invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination, and on order to show cause by the district court, he was
adjudged in contempt. Brown, after a dismissal of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, appealed, urging that the 1893 immunity statute coupled
with the Interstate Commerce Act was unconstitutional, since it failed to
provide an immunity equivalent to absolute silence. The Supreme Court
(5-4) held otherwise. Ibid, 610.
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the immunity type statute containing twofold protection
like the present Act - forbidding prosecution springing
from the testimony and use of the testimony itself - sur-
vived the test of constitutionality by the narrowest of
margins. Brown v. Walker held, inter alia, that the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not shield one's reputation
through an absolute right of silence;"s and that the statutory
interdiction against prosecution relating to any transaction,
matter or thing disclosed through compelled testimony
applied to State as well as Federal courts. But Brown, un-
like Ullmann, was engaged in financial chicanery. Ullmann
was believed to be a Communist. Here, then, was the core
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's logical problem - is an im-
munity statute that is valid if directed toward economic
malpractitioners just as good if its focus is turned against
political subversives?
After dismissing a suggestion that the district judge
must exercise discretion in granting the testimony-
compelling order by placing the Court's imprimatur on
District Judge Weinfeld's apposite contrary finding," Jus-
tice Frankfurter continued his exposition of judicial rela-
tivism in philosophic overtones not unlike his concurring
opinion in Dennis v. United States.20
On one hand there is national security, which is not a
seductive cliche,2' but the most pervasive aspect of all
"Justice Brown, in Brown v. Walker, ibid, 605-606, observed:
"A person who commits a criminal act is bound to contemplate the
consequences of exposure to his good name and reputation, and ought
not to call upon the courts to protect that which he has himself
esteemed to be of such little value .... The design of the constitutional
privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character but to
protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him
of a criminal charge."
Cf. also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906).
" "Certainly, it [the legislative history] contains nothing that requires
the court to reject the construction which statutory language clearly
requires. Especially is this so where the construction contended for
purports to raise a serious constitutional question as to the role of the
judiciary under the doctrine of separation of powers."
In re Ullman, 128 F. Supp. 617, 627 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1955). Compare
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERIOAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
(1955), 12. This finding may be somewhat disconcerting to some of the
commentators regarding the security offered by the Act to the witness.
However, because of the difference in the language between subsection (c)
and subsections (a) and (b), whether or not the holding would apply to
the latter provisions is an open question. Cf. King, Immunity for Witnesses:
An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A. B. A. J. 377 (1954). See also Immunity for
Witnesses Before Congressional Committees: The Scope of Section 8486,
29 St. Johns L. Rev. 153 (1954), and cf. infra, n. 41.
,341 U. S. 494 (1951), cone. op. 517.
U Justice Frankfurter applied this seminal expression to Chief Justice
Marshall's famous "absolute" in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431
(U. S. 1819), that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy". See
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sovereignty - the right of a government to maintain its
very existence.22 On the other hand, careful scrutiny must
be given to observe any diminution of the historic civil
rights of the individual. But, it must be realized that "no
society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice in-
dividual welfare to its own existence".2" In the instant case,
these competing objects of desire do not conflict; there has
been no diminution of individual civil rights.24 The exer-
cise of power by state courts is admittedly restricted by the
Immunity Act. But such a restriction, once upheld under
the Commerce Clause, can most certainly be sustained by
the exigencies of national security."
According to Mr. Justice Douglas, there are no interests
to be balanced when dealing with Fifth Amendment privi-
Graves v. N. Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939), cone. op. 487. See also
KONEFSKY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
(1949), 69-72.
Supra, n. 20, 519. Although it remains undefined in Ullman, national
security, considered in the light of Dennis, implies a realization that
"Communist doctrines . . . are in the ascendency in powerful nations who
cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness to the Institutions of this country"
(ibid, 547), and that the avowed purpose of the Communist Party in
America is not to conduct seminars in political theory (ibid, 546).
2HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1949) 43.
"Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, di8. op. 440 (1956). Justice
Frankfurter's rationale on this point Is clearly summarized in the con-
clusion to the opinion of the Court:
"We are not dealing with one of the vague, undefinable, admonitory
provisions of the Constitution whose scope is inevitably addressed to
changing circumstances. The privilege against self-incrimination is a
specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is
worth a volume of logic'; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
349. For the history Of the privilege establishes not only that It Is not
to be interpreted literally, but also that its sole concern is, as its name
indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading
to the Infliction of 'penalties affixed to the . . . criminal acts' ; Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634. . . . Immunity displaces the danger.
Once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases." Ibid,
438-9.
Again the essence of the Frankfurterian judicial method is made clear.
The problem is not simply to draw an inanimate mechanical conclusion
from given premises; as Justice Frankfurter points out, even cybernetics
has not yet claimed this field; Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 171
(1952). Compare also Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell L. Q.
17, 23 (1924). The problem is to find statements of general principles and
of particular fact which lead to the development of a conclusion. See
GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE (1941) 39, quoted in CAHILL, JuDICIAL
LEGISLATION (1952) 147. If historic principle does not specifically forbid
the legislative experiment, it should not be aborted by judicial flat.
A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U. S. 538, 553 (1949). The tyranny
of absolute concepts must be avoided. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U. S. 495, 517-518 (1952).
2 See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179 (1954). The statute in question
was the original Section 3486 of title 18 (ibid, 180, n. 1). The original
purpose of this section, to compel incriminating testimony, was frustrated
by the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). See also
United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 335-337 (1950).
[VOL. XVII
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lege against self-incrimination. For "the critical point is
that the Constitution places the right of silence beyond the
reach of government".2 6 "The privilege is limited to crimi-
nal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which
it seeks to guard."27 What are these mischiefs? Justice
Douglas describes three.
First, he says the risk of subsequent prosecution is a
very real one. 8 Justice Douglas is undoubtedly correct in
concluding that by granting immunity from prosecution
relating to any transaction, matter, or thing embraced by
the testimony, Congress did not intend to remove certain
civil disabilities of being a communist, which are coupled
with related criminal penalties. Because of this, Justice
Douglas says "that the privilege of silence is exchanged for
a partial, undefined, vague immunity. It means that Con-
gress has granted far less than it has taken away. '"29
Secondly, the shield of absolute silence safeguards indi-
vidual conscience and human dignity. Prying open the lips
of an accused violates these rights.8 0 Thirdly, the privilege
was intended to prevent prosecution by indirection, through
the force of public opinion.3' Now, as in the ever widening
2 Ullmann v. United States, supra, n. 24, di8. op. 440, 454.
21 Blatchford, J., in Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, n. 25, 562, quoted in
Ullmann v. United States, dis. op., ibid, 443.
'Supra, n. 24, 443. See United States v. Weinburg, 65 F. 2d 394, 396
(2d Cir., 1933). As the court realistically put it: "The actual adjudication
of immunity can be made only in a subsequent prosecution of the witness
for a crime concerning which he had testified."
, Supra, n. 24, 445. For a partial list of relevant statutory provisions see
fn. 1 to Justice Douglas' opinion.
IMIbid. Justice Douglas further reasons 'that penalty or forfeiture, the
limits of the Fifth Amendment privilege set in Boyd v. United States, supra,
n. 24, should include the loss of rights of citizenship. It follows a fortiori
that property rights should be held in no greater constitutional esteem than
personal freedom.
mIbid, 449. Justice Douglas' principal spokesman on this point, Judge
Peter S. Grosscup, was probably not unmindful of De Toequeville when, in
United States v. James, he wrote:
"The oppression of crowns and principalities is unquestionably over,
but the more frightful oppression of selfish, ruthless, and merciless
majorities may yet constitute one of the chapters of future history. In
my opinion, the privilege of silence, against a criminal accusation,
guarantied by the fifth amendment, was meant to extend to all the
consequences of disclosure."
60 F. 257, 265 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1894). This case followed in the wake of
Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, n. 25, and went on to interpret the Fifth
Amendment as providing an absolute right of silence. See Dixon, The Fifth
Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 447,
458 (1954). Compare De Tocqueville's analysis:
"The majority in that country [United States], therefore, exercise
a prodigious actual authority, and a power of opinion which is nearly
as great; no obstacles exist which can impede or even retard its progress
so as to make it heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon
its path."
1 DE TocQuEvILrL, DEmOCRACY IN A ERICA (Vintage ed., 1955) 266.
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past, to stand condemned before infamy, the faceless
prosecutor, may be far more terrifying than corporal
punishment. 2
In his reach for the absolute it is not clear whether or
not Justice Douglas has sound historical support. For such
support, one must look back beyond Brown v. Walker."8
The breadth of the privilege is not entirely clear in Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock . 4 In that case a unanimous Court struck
down an immunity statute because the immunity extended
only to prevent the use of compelled testimony in future
prosecution, and not to prevent the use of other evidence
that could be acquired as a result of the knowledge obtained
from the compelled testimony. It was not decided if com-
plete statutory immunity could be attained. The equally
puzzling question of whether the privilege extended to
preclude mental as well as physical torture in obtaining a
confession (or compelling testimony) leads into an unan-
swerable play on words. The existence of strong evidence
that standing mute was at one time tantamount to a plea of
guilty would seem to countervail such an idea.8 5 Moreover,
in an early day, in United States v. Aaron Burr,36 Chief
Justice Marshall felt that the witness should not be com-
pelled to disclose a fact that would evince an "essential part
of a crime which is punishable by the laws".87 In his attempt
to mathematically equate an immunity statute with a
clause of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Douglas seems to
offer to a recalcitrant witness something which he never
had."8
Justice Douglas refers also to Mr. Justice Field's dissenting statement
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 628, 631 (1896), that it was the purpose
of the privilege to protect the accused "from all compulsory testimony
which would expose him to infamy and disgrace".
mIbid. The cases following Brown v. Walker are uniform in their posi-
tion that an Immunity statute deprives a witness of the right to refuse to
answer. Of. Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79 (1915) ; Heike v. United
States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U. S. 25 (1904); and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 67 et 8eq. (1906).
It has also been suggested that a witness may not refuse to testify if
prosecution for the crime is barred by limitations. Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U. S. 275, 282 (1897) ; Hale v. Henkel, ibid, 67.
" Supra, n. 25.
5See Morgan, The Privilege Again8t Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 19-21 (1949).
"In re Willie, 25 F. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (C. C. D. Va., 1807).
Ibid, 40.
IThe eloquent dissenting opinion seems an unnecessary reminder to the
majority of the Court, who display no irreverence for individual liberty.
For the majority of the American people, however, it could serve as a
resolute reminder not to forget our first principles. In our times, mass
communication media serve as actuators to the hydraulic pressure of public
opinion. Such pressure is akin to emotion, not reason.
[VOL. XVIT
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The fear of solving complex social issues which lie in
the penumbra of the law'9 through a case by case approach,
rather than by fixation to immutable principles, seems to
be an atavistic longing for a return to natural law. Society
is dynamic. The task of the law is to define relationships
between variable points in the social structure. ° In so
doing it must look to the consequences of the activity in
question, with due respect for principle and precedent,
rather than blind worship at their altar.
The Supreme Court has decisively found that an act
granting a witness immunity, in exchange for compelled
testimony relating to sedition before a grand jury, is good
law. The Court in the Ullmann case expressly reserved
ruling on the validity of the perhaps more highly contro-
versial sub-sections (a) and (b) of the Immunity Act that
grant immunity for compelled testimony before the Houses
of Congress and Congressional Committees.4'
J. ELwoOD ARMSTRONG
See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Col. L. Rev. 1,
32 (1934).
" The competing values of an industrial democratic society grow more
complex with time. But the basic problem of government, succinctly stated
in the Federalist, remains unchanged:
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this; you must first enable the govern-
ment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to con-
trol itself."
THE FEREEALIST, No. 51 (Dunne's ed., 1901), 354.
1350 U. S. 440 (1956), Sub-sections (a) and (b) relate to immunity in
exchange for compelled testimony before the House of Congress and
Congressional committees. Significantly with respect to the district court
order it is provided in these sub-sections that "Such an order may be issued
by a United States district court judge" and that neither House nor any
of their Committees shall grant immunity to any witness "without first
having notified the Attorney General of the United States of such action
and thereafter having secured the approval of the United States district
court .... " (Italics added.) See In re Ullmann, 128 F. Supp. 617 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y., 1955). For comment antipathetic to these provisions of the
Act see Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Georgetown L. J. 497, 511-512 (1954).
The Supreme Court has never passed on the constitutionality of a statute
giving legislative committees the power to grant immunity. Ibid, 506. But,
ci. Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 157 (1955) ; Emspak v. United
States, 349 U. S. 190, 194 (1955), and Bart v. United States, 349 U. S. 219
(1955), allowing witness -to claim his privilege by basing refusal to answer
questions on "primarily the first amendment, supplemented by the fifth"
and further holding that to support contempt convictions there must be a
clear ruling on the claim of privilege, and the witness must be clearly and
specifically informed that he is being directed to answer, despite his claim
of privilege.
